On February 24, 2022, Russia launched its full-scale invasion in Ukraine. In the three years since the invasion, the war has become Europe’s largest armed conflict since World War II. While a clear picture of the death toll in the war is unclear, officials in Ukraine and Russia estimate that tens of thousands of soldiers on both sides have been killed, with many more wounded. The civilian death toll in the war is estimated to be over 12,000.

In recent days, officials from the US and Russia met in Saudi Arabia and agreed to work toward a peace agreement in the war; however, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said his country will not accept a peace deal without Ukraine’s involvement in peace talks.

To mark the third anniversary of the war, we asked SIS professor Keith Darden a few questions about the status of the conflict and what it may take to reach a peace deal.

In the three years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, how has the scope of the conflict evolved? How have Russia’s goals in this conflict changed as Ukraine has continued to fight back?

At the outset of the invasion in February 2022, Russia’s goal was to rapidly seize Kyiv and depose the Ukrainian government while sending forces across Southern and Eastern Ukraine. That plan failed, and Russia lost many of its elite units, as well as much of its armor (tanks, armored personnel carriers, etc.) and equipment. By spring of 2022, it was already clear that Russia’s invasion had effectively failed. Their troops withdrew from Kyiv, and there was serious discussion of a negotiated settlement. Then, in September 2022, a surprise Ukrainian counter-offensive in Kharkiv province led to a chaotic Russian retreat, and eventually to the withdrawal of Russian forces from Kherson to the East side of the Dnipro/Dnieper River in November. But Russia also formally annexed the partially occupied provinces of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson—which both indicated a shift in their immediate goals in the war (to annex territory) and signaled that they would be willing to use nuclear weapons to defend what was now formally Russian territory.

The end of the first year of the war saw the beginning of a very different phase of the war—the grinding, attritional infantry battle along a front line stretching for hundreds of miles. It also saw the beginning of Russia’s use of long-range strike capabilities (missiles and drones) to destroy Ukrainian energy infrastructure. This is the war of the past two years, with both sides blowing through enormous stocks of artillery, ammunition, and—unfortunately—manpower. There has also been intensive military innovation on both sides, particularly in electronic warfare and unmanned systems, and the increasing reliance on external partners to supply forces in the field. Russia is slowly winning this phase of the war and seems to be better able to continue fighting it than the Ukrainians. That would be true even if we were willing to continue to supply Ukraine with as much weaponry and ammunition as we are able to produce, which is not the case for the current US administration.

To sum up, the nature and scope of the war has changed quite a bit over the past three years, but it is unclear whether and how Russia’s goals have changed. It’s very clear that this is not simply about acquiring territory for them, but whether they will be willing to yield on other goals like a change of the government in Kyiv, the demilitarization of Ukraine, and the renegotiation of a European security framework is very much an open question.

What are the roadblocks/obstacles you see that are preventing a peace deal at this stage? What are non-negotiables you think will need to be met to move forward and reach a peace deal?

There are two obstacles to a peace deal, one general and the other very specific. One obstacle to peace is optimism. Throughout this war, when one of the sides has been optimistic that they can achieve their goals through more progress on the battlefield, they have been unwilling to make concessions. At the moment, Russia is optimistic that they can continue to make progress on the battlefield, that time is on their side, and the US and Europe are no longer willing or able to support Ukraine at the levels required. This will make them very reluctant to make significant concessions in the negotiations.

The other main obstacle to reaching a peace deal is more specific—the question of security guarantees for Ukraine. It’s pretty clear that any peace deal will, at a minimum, involve some version of “land for peace,” with Ukraine giving up territory in exchange for a peace settlement. Ukraine is understandably concerned that they will give up land but not get a durable peace. The Ukrainian concern is that Russia will conclude that they can acquire land through force and get away with it, and Russia will be likely to use force again in the future. To assuage this legitimate concern, Ukraine wants security guarantees from the only country that they believe can provide it—the United States. But the prospect of a future US military presence or alliance with Ukraine is a red line for the Russians; They would rather continue fighting indefinitely. So, we are at an impasse where an agreement between Ukraine and Russia seems unlikely unless Ukraine chooses to give up territory without any guarantee that Russia will not press its advantage further in the future. If our European allies were more capable and had not radically underinvested in their militaries over the past decades, it is possible that European countries could have provided a security guarantee, and that Russia may have felt more comfortable with that. But no European states are in a position to guarantee Ukraine’s security in the event of a resumed war with Russia.

Why has the Trump administration shifted the US approach towards a bilateral US-Russia negotiation process when the Biden administration had focused on establishing a coherent US-Europe-Ukrainian position and refused to negotiate with Russia?

Even if Kamala Harris had been elected President, the US would have had to reduce its military assistance to Ukraine or shift over to more of a war economy to sustain them. We have been drawing down our existing stocks to ship to Ukraine, and we produce munitions at a very slow rate. This is doubly true for our European allies who have not dramatically increased their extremely low levels of arms production. The Trump administration wants to cut a deal to end a costly war that we can no longer sustain. They also are reluctant to make future commitments to provide security to Europe so that European states can continue to have spending priorities other than their defense. The Europeans and, more understandably, the Ukrainians, have an interest in a costly US security commitment to Ukraine and to Europe. The “nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine and Europe” principle essentially gives those actors a veto over US security policy. Our interests are not identical to those of our allies, and the Trump administration would like to achieve a settlement that places less of a burden on the United States. For that, they need to speak directly with Russia and get a mutual sense of what each side is willing to concede and offer. Neither the Europeans nor Ukraine needs to be present for that. If the Europeans were better able to provide for their own security or the security of Ukraine, then it would make more sense for them to have a veto. Otherwise, they might make commitments and demands that only the US can back up, and that this administration is no longer willing to commit to. 

This is Europe’s largest armed conflict since WWII. What do you think will be the legacy of this war in Europe?

I think the legacy of this war will be to end the blanket prohibition against changing borders through force—there may be more exceptions made in the future. I hope that the war will also lead to a more robust indigenous pan-European defense capability—something along the lines of the European Defense Community proposed in 1952 with a common army under supra-national command. My worry, however, is that the likely legacy of this war will be that European borders are once again open to challenge, and that large European states will substitute for the US by developing their own offensive capability. A fragmented, segregated, national defense capability in Europe will not only be a poor substitute for the United States in NATO, but it will also increase the likelihood of intra-European alliances and territorial conflicts in the future.